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NOTES
SOME UNION UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
When, on June 23, 1947, more than two-thirds of the members of
the Senate of the United States voted to override the President's veto
of the Labor Management Relations Act, generally referred to as the
Taft-Hartley Act,' the United States had adopted the most detailed,
most complex, and most comprehensive national labor legislation in
the history of the nation. According to its proponents, the Act is
designed to establish a balance of power between employers and
unions, to protect employee rights, and to emphasize and safeguard
the public interest. It amends and re-enacts the National Labor Rela-
tions Act2, commonly known as the Wagner Act, which has been the
subject of continuous litigation and judicial interpretation during the
past twelve years. It also extends statutory regulation in labor matters
to areas not previously covered. Many of the changes effected by the
Act are designed to remedy troublesome situations brought about by
specific judicial and administrative decisions interpreting the National
Labor Relations Act and the Norris-La Guardia Act.3
Because of the scope of the Act, it would be extremely difficult to
discuss all of the problems presented. The following Note is intended
to point to some of the more interesting problems existing before the
passage of this Act, and the effect of the Act on these problems. This
discussion will be principally concerned with Section 8 (b), entirely
new in this statute, which for the first time expressly makes unions
responsible for unfair conduct under a federal labor law. The actions
of labor unions and their agents which are now unfair are specified in
Section 8 (b) as "unfair labor practices", and the new Act's procedure
for the prevention of unfair labor practices has application to these
practices as well as to the unfair labor practices of the employer.
Inter-Union Disputes as to Bargaining Representative
Section 8 (b) (4) (C) : It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to engage in, or to induce or
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
'Pub. L. No. iox, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (June 23, 1947). Hereinafter referred to as
the Taft-Hartley Act.
249 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.CA. § § 151-166 (Supp. 1940) •
347 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § § 101-115 (Supp. 1940).
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services, where an object thereof is: forcing or requiring any
employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organi-
zation as the representative of his employees if another labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 9 (a) .4
This subsection outlaws strikes and boycotts in defiance of Labor
Board certifications. As stated by the Senate Committee, it prohibits
"strikes and boycots having as their purpose forcing any employer to
disregard his obligation to recognize and bargain with a certified union
and in lieu thereof to bargain with or recognize another union."
Picketing or other persuasive union activity in aid of these strikes and
boycotts is illegal under Section 8 (b) (4).
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act the remedy of the
employer and the certified union had been at best uncertain. The
Norris-La Guardia Act was the most formidable bar to injunction,
inasmuch as peaceful picketing, striking, the publicizing of such
strikes, and their financial maintenance could not be enjoined under
the Act as long as a labor dispute existed. 6 Subsequently, the National
Labor Relations Act was passed, assuring to employees the right to
negotiate with the employer through representatives selected by a
majority of their number. The question inevitably arose whether, in
the light of the latter Act, conflicts between employers and unions
representing only a minority of employees or no employees at all were
still to be termed labor disputes making applicable the Norris-La
Guardia Act. Further, if such conflicts were labor.disputes within the
meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act, was the employer or the union
representing the majority of the employees nevertheless entitled to
1§ 9 (a) would make the representatives chosen by the majority of the employees
in a bargaining unit the- exclusive representative of all the employees for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Act provides that any
individual employee or group of employees may "present grievances to their
employer." Placing a strang construction upon this language, the Labor Board says
that while employees may "present grievances in person, the representative has the
right to take over the grievances." The amended section permits the employees and
their employer to settle the grievances, but only if the settlement is not inconsistent
with the terms of any collective bargaining agreement then in effect. The proviso is
thus given its obvious and proper meaning.
'Sen. Rep. No. lo5, 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 22.
OSec. 13 (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act defines a labor dispute to include "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons negotiating, fixing... conditions of employ-
ment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee." (italics supplied)
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protection against the picketing of minority groups because of special
rights created by the National Labor Relations Act?
7
Illustrative of the situation in which a minority group waged
industrial warfare against an organized majority group was the case
of Oberman and Co. v. United Garment Workers of America.8 De-
fendants, members of a C.I.O. organization, petitioned for an election
in plaintiff corporation's factory in order to determine the representa-
tives of the employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. An
employees' association, a union the members of which were restricted
to employees of the corporation, received a majority of the votes and
was certified by the National Labor Relations Board as bargaining
representative. Nevertheless, the defendant union called a strike, de-
manding sole bargaining privileges and a closed shop. Picketing,
violence, and intimidation were alleged, as a result of which plaintiff's
factory had to shut down. It was held that plaintiff was entitled to a
restraining order, apparently on the reasoning that activities which
were directed to ends opposed to the administration of the National
Labor Relations Act could not be intended to be protected from
injunction. In a word, the immunities of the anti-injunction law were
only to be afforded in labor disputes waged for a lawful purpose.
Whether the injunction would issue to prevent a minority from
waging labor warfare to gain recognition where the majority had a
contract but had not been certified had been answered in the negative
in Lund v. Woodenware Workers' Union.9 The Oberman opinion
distinguished the Lund case on the basis of the certification, but
approved of the following reinarks in the Lund opinion:
"...We would have the anomalous situation of the courts
endeavoring to determine whether or not the unit which is
7 § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act provided that "Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment...," while § 8 (3) of the Act declared it to be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization...," and § 8 (5) of the Act declared it to be an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees.... Sec. 13 of the Act provided that "Nothing in
this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike." Finally, § 2 (9) of the Act defined a "labor dispute" in terms
practically identical with those contained in § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. (See
Note 6, supra).
S21 F. Supp. 2o (W. D. Mo. 1937).
9ig F. Supp. 607 (D. C. Minn. 1937).
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formed by the majority of the employees is appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining, when it is clearly evident that
Congress intended that all such questions should be determined
by the Labor Board and not by the courts.
"...And no proceedings between employer and employee
under the Wagner Act are entitled to any protection by the
court until some affirmative action has been taken by the Labor
Board, which is clothed with the only authority for such
purposes."10
The point made was that, until the Board has certified a majority
union, a court should not attempt to protect contracts from the
onslaughts of the minority group. The distinction is difficult to justify,
since certification is no more than an administrative determination of
majority representation under the National Labor 'Relations Act, the
employer being obligated to bargain with the majority union even in
the absence of certification."' And it would seem that lack of certifica-
tion should not preclude the issuance of an injunction where the
majority representation is clear. To be sure, however, certification
relieves the court of the duty of ascertaining whether the contracting
union did represent a majority of the employees at the time of making
the contract.
The Oberman case and the element of reason which it instilled in
the law appears to have been entirely discredited by the more recent
federal decisions, which almost uniformly hold that the Norris-La
Guardia Act deprives the federal courts of the power to enjoin striking,
even though the purpose of the strike is the unlawful one of inducing
20ig F. Supp. 607, 609, 61o (D. C. Minn. 1937).
"The National Labor Relations Act imposes the duty upon employers to
bargain collectively only with the chosen representatives of their employees, and the
implied duty is not to bargain with anyone else. National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937). "The
employer acts at his peril in refusing to recognize a duly selected bargaining agency
of an appropriate unit of his employees unless the facts show that in the exercise of
reasonable judgment he lacked knowledge of the appropriateness of the unit or the
selection of the majority representatives." National Labor Relations Board v. Piqua
Munising Wood Products Co., iog F. (2d) 552, 556 (C.C.A. 6th, 1940), enforcing 7
N.L.R.B. 782 (1938). See also the following Board decisions holding either expressly or
impliedly that the employer's duty to bargain collectively with the proper bargain-
ing agency of his employees takes effect upon majority authorization without Board
certification in the absence of circumstances which raise reasonable doubt in con-
nection with the claim to majority authorization. The Warfield Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 58
(1938); National Motor Bearing Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 409 (1938), enforced as mod. 1o5 F.
(ad) 652 (C.C.A. 9th, 1939); Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N.L.R.B. lo (1937); Burnside Steel




a violation of the National Labor Relations Act.' 2 While some of the
lower courts have ruled, in effect, that "motive" for picketing may be
inquired into in passing on the right of an employer to an injunction,
yet the ruling of the United States Supreme Court is to the contrary. In
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., the Supreme Court said,
relative to the definition of a labor dispute in the Norris-La Guardia
Act, that "The Act does not concern itself with the background or the
motives of the dispute."' 3 In the case of Lauf v. Shinner14 the union
'demanded that the employer require his employees, as a condition of
their continued employment, to become members of the union. When
the employer left the decision to the employees, they refused to join,
and the union was not chosen by the employees to represent them in
any matter connected with their employment. Nevertheless, to coerce
the employer to require his employees to join the union and accept it as
a bargaining agent, theunion picketed the employer, charging him with
being unfair to organized labor. The district court held that no labor
dispute existed and that an injunction could therefore be granted. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, 15 but the
Supreme Court held that the district court erred in holding that there
was no labor dispute:
"The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the declarations of
policy in the Norris-La Guardia Act and the Wisconsin Labor
Code, to the effect that employees are to have full freedom of
association, self organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, free from interference, restraint, or
coercion of their employers, puts this case outside the scope of
both acts, since respondent cannot accede to the petitioner's
demands upon it without disregarding the policy declared by
the statutes."' 6
"In the following cases injunctive relief was denied where an employer was the
plaintiff: Sharp & Dohme v. Storage Whse. Employees Union, 24 F. Supp. 7o (E.D.
Pa. 1938); Cupples Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 2o F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo.
1937); Houston and North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local Union, 24 F. Supp.
619 (W.D. Okla. 1938). Injunctive relief was also denied where plaintiff was an
aggrieved majority union. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union,
io5 F. (2d) i (App. D. C. 1939), aff'd 3o8 U. S. 522, 60 S. Ct. 291, 84 L. ed. 443 ('939);
Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938). It seems to be immaterial
whether or not the majority union has been certified. United Electric Radio &
Machinery Workers of America v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
3o F. Supp. 927 (S.D. N.Y. 194o), aff'd 115 F. (2d) 488 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940).
""303 U. S. 552, 561, 58 S. Ct. 703, 707, 82 L.ed. ioi2, oi6 (1938).
'A303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578, 82 L.ed. 872 (1938).
159o F. (2d) 250 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1937).
20303 U. S. 323, 330, 58 S. Ct. 578, 582, 82 L.ed. 872, 877-878, (1938).
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Following the decision in the Lauf case, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals purported to recognize in Grace Co. v. Williams17 , decided
in 1938, that equity must protect from outside interference the per-
formance of the employer's duty to deal with the majority union,
though an injunction was denied because the procedural requirements
of the Norris-La Guardia Act had not been followed. From the dictum
of that case, it would seem that even peaceful picketing would be
enjoined. However, in a later decision 18 it was held that the equivalent
right of the employer not to have the minority interfere with him
while the Board is deciding the certification question was limited by
the Norris-La Guardia Act and thus peaceful picketing could not be
enjoined.
The inferences of the Grace Co. case were further refuted in
American Chain and Cable Co. v. Truck Drivers and Helpers Union,19
decided in 1946. There the local A.F.L. union continued to picket the
plant of the employer after the Board had certified the local C.I.O.
union as the bargaining representative of the employees. The court
recognized that under the Board certification the employer had a duty
to bargain with the C.I.O. union and had a right to be protected in the
performance of this duty by the general equity powers of the federal
courts. The court nevertheless denied the injunction, because the
controversy constituted a labor dispute under the Norris-La Guardia
Act.
Under recent decisions it seems to be immaterial whether or not
the majority union has been certified. In Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Bren-
nan it was held that the minority union, though having no standing as
collective bargaining agent, may strike or otherwise manifest dissatis-
faction to the results of the election, notwithstanding certification of
another union by the Board. The court observed:
"It may be urged that the situation presented strongly
emphasizes the extreme one-sidedness of the National Labor
Relations Act legislation; that is, the employer is bound to
comply with the orders of the Board, but the employees are free
to flout the Board's decision and create the anomalous and often
calamitous situation of an employer's being caught, without
fault on his part, between the upper and nether niillstones. We
are not unmindful of the apparent harsh consequences of our
ruling, but such a result must not be permitted to affect our
112o F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Mo. 1937), aff'd 86 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th, 1938).
'1Cupples Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 2o F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1937).
'168 F. Supp. 54 (D.C. N. J. 1946).
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judgment in applying the law in the field of interpretation. We
do not have the power to legislate. In labor disputes, we have
only such equity jurisdiction as Congress has seen fit to grant."
20
And in J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks' Union,2 1 the owner of a
retail store, who was making preparations to open the store for
business, sought to enjoin a clerks' union from picketing the store
prior to the employment of any employees. The purpose of the picket-
ing, apparently, was to compel the employer to make an agreement
to employ only members of the defendant union or those who would
agree to become .members. The injunction was sought upon the theory
that the employer could not, under the National Labor Relations Act,
make the agreement sought as under that Act the employer is obliged
to bargain with a union designated by a majority of his employees.
Not having hired any employees as yet, the employer was allegedly not
in a position to make a contract with the picketing union. The in
junction was again denied because the controversy constituted a labor
dispute under the Norris-La Guardia Act.
The problem would seem to arise in the certification cases from the
failure of Congress to provide any legislation whereby orders of the
National Labor Relations Board become binding upon the em-
ployees.22 In a carefully considered opinion District Judge Nordbye, in
Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, pointed out:
"A reading of the Wagner Act impels the view that it was
passed primarily to eliminate unfair labor practices on the part
of the employer, to guarantee to the employees the right of self-
organization, and to secure the right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. There is no
express provision in the act which seeks to affect, limit, or curb
unfair practices on the part of labor towards the employer....
There is no intimation in the act that, merely because an em-
ployer has entered into a contract with a majority union,
Congress assumed to vest jurisdiction in the United States courts
to protect or safeguard the integrity of such contract.
' '23
059 F. Supp. 625, 633 (D.C. Minn. 1945).
"67 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Mo. 1946). This is a particularly strong case, as the union
attempted to compel the employer to agree to a closed shop contract before any
employees were hired. Compliance with this demand would be a clear violation of
the National Labor Relations Act.
"rhis impasse has been corrected by Section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act,
making it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in strikes and secondary
boycotts for certain defined purposes. The National Labor Relations Act provided
only for employer unfair labor practices.
319 F. Supp. 607, 609 (D.C. Minn. 1937).
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Attempts of the employer to obtain relief through the state courts
have met with a somewhat greater degree of success than in the federal
courts. Being unfettered by the limitations of the Norris-La Guardia
Act, state courts in general have enjoined striking or picketing when it
was found to be illegal under an application of the unlawful purpose
test.24 It has been suggested that the Norris-La Guardia Act has vir-
tually revolutionized the substantive law governing strikes, picketing,
and boycotts under cover of procedural prevention, through broad
interpretation of the words "labor dispute," as employed in that Act.25
However, state courts in construing their anti-injunction statutes are
not bound by the United States Supreme Court's construction of the
Norris-La Guardia Act, as to what is a "labor dispute." Instead of
2 'In Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N. Y. 188, 42
N.E. (2d) 480 (1942), the Court of Appeals held, for the first time, that picketing in
furtherance of a jurisdictional controversy was illegal, did not constitute a "labor
dispute" under the anti-injunction law, and may be enjoined, where the picketed
employer was under contract with a union certified by the New York State Labor
Relations Board as the proper and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees. The
picketing union in the Florsheim case was a party to the Board's certification pro-
ceedings. While holding in Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mill v. International Wood
Workers of America, 104 Wash. Dec. 8o, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940), that picketing may
be enjoined by one union where the employer was under contract with another
union certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the employees' bargaining
representative, the Washington Supreme Court held in Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v.
Everett District Council, 119 P. (2d) 643 (Wash. 1941) that no injunction will be
granted where, though the contracting union represented a majority of the
employer's employees at the time of the making of the contract, it was not certified
by the Board. A similar distinction has been made in Oregon. Thus in Markham &
Callow v. International Wood Workers, 135 P. (2d) 727 (Ore. 1943), it was held that
an employer under contract with a union certified by the Labor Relations Board
may enjoin picketing carried on in behalf of employees discharged by the employer
pursuant to the closed shop provisions of the contract, but in Stone Logging &
Contracting Co. v. International Workers, 135 P. (2d) 759 (Ore. 1943), on the other
hand, the employer was denied an injunction in a comparable situation simply
because the union, with which the employer was under contract, had not been
certified. The employer .was concededly subject to the Wagner Act and apparently
there was no dispute that the contracting union represented a majority of the
employees. But it is evident from the well-reasoned decision of the court that it was
reluctant to assume the task of deciding whether the contract was in full conform-
ance with law. What the court virtually told employers in the state of Oregon was
that if they desired protection against outside picketing they should insist that
unions seeking conracts secure certification by the Board.
2Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) §.436. But a federal
court has taken the opposite view, holding that the Norris-La Guardia Act has not
deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain labor controversies, but has
undertaken merely to regulate the manner of exercising such jurisdiction. Miller
Parlor Furniture Co. Inc. v. Furniture Workers Industrial Union, 8 F. Supp. 209
(D.C. N. J. 1934).
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construing the state laws as excluding the judiciary from labor contro-
versies, state courts have almost uniformly held that such laws are
procedural statutes which merely regulate the jurisdiction of the courts
and have little if any effect upon prior substantive law.
26
The troublesome problem in the state cases arises in deciding to
what extent a union might be restrained without unduly infringing
labor's right to strike or picket under the guaranty of free speech
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
27
The problem is neatly illustrated in the recent California case of Park
and Tilford Import Corporation v. International Brotherhood.2s In
that case the plaintiff employer could not comply with the defendant
union's demands for a dosed shop without violating the National La-
bor Relations Act, since the union's membership did not include any of
plaintiff's employees. The California Supreme Court, applying the un-
lawful-purpose test, held that the defendant union might be enjoined
from striking and picketing insofar as its purpose was to compel
plaintiff to violate the National Labor Relations Act. The court
refused to enjoin all concerted action, however, holding that defendant
might continue to strike or picket for the purpose of organizing
plaintiff's employees, so long as it refrained from demanding that
plaintiff violate the federal stattite. The California Supreme Court
reasoned:
"See Fashioncraft Inc. v. Halpern, where the court stated that the anti-
injunction statute "deals entirely with questions of jurisdiction, the conditions upon
which injunctions may be issued in labor disputes, and the procedure to be followed
in reference to injunctions and contempts.... It leaves unimpaired the distinction
heretofore existing between legal and illegal strikes .... It neither restricts nor
broadens the boundaries of permissible picketing.... In a word, the statute did not
change the substantive law as to either the legality of a strike or the lawfulness of
picketing." (italics supplied) 313 Mass. 385, 48 N. E. (2d) 1, 4 (1943). See also
Isolantite Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 129 A. (2d) 183 (N. J.
1942); Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N. W. (2d) 905 (1945).
7In Thornhill v. Alabama an Alabama statute which forbade all picketing was
held unconstitutional. In that case Justice Murphy declared that "The freedom of
speech and of the press which are secured by the First Amendment against abridge-
ment by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties
which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement
by a state." 31o U. S. 88, 95, 6o S. Ct. 736, 740, 84 L.ed. 1o93, 1o98 (1940). In Ameri-
can Federation of Labor v. Swing, the United States Supreme Court went a step
further in making peaceful picketing immune from injunction. The Court there al-
lowed picketing by an outside union for the purpose of inducing the employer to
require his employees to become members of that union: 312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568,
85 L. ed. 855 (1941). The possible impact of constitutional guarantees of free speech
upon § 8 (b) (4) will be discussed in Section III of this Note.
28165 P. (2d) 891 (Cal. 1946).
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"The dilemma in these cases arises from a failure to under-
stand that the basic conflict is between the union and non-union
workers. Until that conflict is resolved the employer is in the
unhappy position of a neutral suffering its repercussions.
"... Though the employer may run the gamut of incon-
veniences and uncertainties, and even disruption of his business,
he is under the harsh duty to maintain his position as a
neutral."
29
The difficulty in applying the court's reasoning would seem to arise
from the permission given the union to picket the employer's premises
as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the employees, and thereby
ultimately secure the very result forbidden by the National Labor
Relations Act.
The Taft-Hartley Act proposes to meet this troublesome situation
by restoring equity jurisdiction to the federal district courts to grant
"such injunctive relief or temporary restraining orders as it deems just
and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law."'30 This sub-
section makes it mandatory upon the Board to petition for injunctive
relief in cases involving unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (4) .31 However, the injunction will not be obtained
with such procedural ease as it was prior to the Norris-La Guardia Act,
for it will only be granted at the instance of the Board, not of a private
party. Thus, a minority union may now be enjoined from striking and
picketing where the majority union has been certified. The Act makes
no mention of "primary" strikes called by the minority union for the
purpose of forcing an employer to withdraw recognition from the
majority union, where the latter has not been certified. Though the
attaching of such significance to certification may be unjustifiable, yet
no particular need exists to protect the recognized union or the
employer when the machinery to obtain certification is available. 32
2165 P. (2d) 891, 898, 899 (Cal. 1946).
"See § 1o (1). (italics supplied)
31lnjunctive relief is mandatory under § io (i) in the case of violations of § 8 (b)
(4) (A), (B), or (C). The same power to apply for injunctions is granted by § lo (i) in
the case of violations of § 8 (b) (4) (D) dealing with jurisdictional strikes. While this
is discretionary with the Board, such injunctions are limited by the more specific
provision of § 1o (1). While it is mandatory where charges are filed under § 8 (b) (4)
(A), (B), or (C) that application for relief be made, it does not appear that ii must be
granted, for § io (i) gives the court "jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or
temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper...."
=Under previous Board practices, petitions for representation elections might be
filed only by trade unions or employees, or by an employer where two or more
unions each claimed to represent a majority of employees. Sec. 9 (c) (i) of the Act as
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Fully aware of the abuses latent in the power of the injunction, the
Board will no doubt proceed cautiously in the exercise of its discretion.
An example of the difficulties which may face the Board can be seen in
the following: Section 9 (c) (3) provides that employees on strike who
are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote in any
election to determine representation. Workers on strike for economic
concessions are entitled to reinstatement only if the employer has
rejected an unconditional offer on their part to return to work befbre
replacements have been hired and while their jobs still remain in
existence.33 Thus, these striking employees who have been perma-
nently replaced are no longer permitted to vote in certification elec-
tions.3 4 If the Board certifies a union selected largely by striker
replacements in an election called at the request of the employer, the
strikers returning to work could hardly be expected to accept the
certification with tranquillity. Obviously this provision places a tre-
mendous weapon in the hands of the employer. If he can keep his
plant open during the strike, and can hire a substantial number of
replacements, the striking union will surely lose any election held
amended permits the filing of petitions "by any group of individuals or employees
or any labor organization, who claim to represent a substantial group of employees,
or who assert that their designated representative no longer represents a majority of
employees (so-called decertification petitions), or by an employer who asserts that
one or more individuals or unions have presented to him claims that they represent
a majority of employees." (italics supplied)
'rThe strike for economic concessions must be distinguished from the strike due
to an employer unfair labor practice. The latter are strikes provoked or prolonged by
an employer unfair labor practice, such as a refusal to bargain or a discriminating
discharge. With respect to such strikers, the Board has established the rule that they
are entitled to reinstatement upon application whenever their jobs remain, even
though the employer has hired replacements. Economic strikes are those in which the
strikers are seeking to compel the employer to accede to a demand for better wages
or working conditions or to compel recognition without a Board certification.
Employees on an "economic" strike are not entitled to reinstatement. See N.L.R.B.
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 58 S. Ct. 904, 82 L.ed. 1381 (1938).
34in the case of Sartorius & Co. Inc., io N.L.R.B. 493 (1938), the Board held that
individuals who took the place of striking employees were not eligible to vote,
though the strike is neither precipitated nor prolonged by any unfair labor practice.
This became known as the Sartorius doctrine. In the case of The Rudolph Wurlitzer
Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 35 (1941), the Board repudiated the Sartorius doctrine, holding that
both strikers and those hired to take their places were eligible to vote. Sec. 2 (3) of
the new Act provides that a striker remains an employee "unless such individual has
been replaced by a regular replacement;" and, at the end of the sub-section, it
defines a "replacement" as being an individual who replaces a striker "if the dura-
tion of his employment is not to be determined with reference to the existence or
duration of such labor dispute." Thus, "strike breakers" may not be regarded as
"replacements."
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during the strike. And once the change of bargaining representatives
becomes effective, the strike by the former employees becomes an
unfair labor practice under Section 8 (b (4) (C). The Board's
dilemma is quite apparent in this situation.8 5 Nevertheless, there is
much merit in the provision. The labor relations acts are intended to
promote industrial peace by guaranteeing the right of collective bar-
gaining and insuring freedom from employer interference with union
effbrts to organize. Where an employer has acted in full accord with a
labor relations act, he has an argument of substance that the promise
of peace underlying the act should become a reality. If an injunction
can be secured against minority groups, employers will in all proba-
bility be less reluctant to fulfill their duties to majority representatives.
Strikes and Picketing To Enforce Secondary Boycotts
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) : It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to engage in, or to induce or
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is: (a) forcing or requiring
any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or
employer organization, or (b) any employer or other person to
cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other-person. 36
In more general terms, clause (a) of this subsection prohibits
strikes or secondary boycotts designed to force a self-employed person
to join a union or to force an employer to join an employer organiza-
tion. Strikes and boycotts within this provision are omitted fronl
consideration in this Note. Clause (b) prohibits strikes and secondary
boycotts to force an employer to cease dealing with another employer.
Typically, this is the situation in which unions having a dispute with
employer A attempt to strengthen their position in the dispute by ap-
plying pressure to force employer B to cease dealing with employer A.
Employer A is thereby subject to the combined pressure of the union
Difficult problems in addition to this ae presented by Section 9 (c) (3). Deter-
mining which employees have been permanently replaced is often an impossible
task, since employees hired during a strike do not in the usual case replace any
identifiable striker. The practical difficulties in the application of this provision are
such that it may lead to the adoption of a rule that no elections will be held during
a strike.
31(italics supplied) This phrase, "where an object thereof is," will be discussed
elsewhere in this section.
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and employer B. This prohibition, originating in the Senate bill which
formed the basis of the Taft-Haitley Act, was explained by the Senate
Committee in its report as follows:
"Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a
strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that em-
ployer to cease doing business with employer B; nor would it be
lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A
uses or otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with
employer B (with whom the union has a dispute) .-17
On its face this subsection seems to go somewhat further than the
illustration cited. Senator Taft, in regard to this subsection, said:
38
"This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to
injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the
disagreement between an employer and his employees." And after
Senator Pepper had cited the decisions in United States v. Hutcheson3 9
and Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl 40 he continued: "... this provision
... reverses the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts."
Not only does the Taft-Hartley Act make unfair labor practices of
such secondary boycotts as fall within this provision, but it also makes
these practices the subject of damage suits4' and immediate court
injunctions,4 2 the Norris-La Guardia Act notwithstanding.43 Section
3o3 (b) of Title III of the Act authorizes suits for damages by "who
ever shall be injured in his business or property" by a prohibited strike
or boycott. During the debates on the floor of the Senate, Senator
Morse pointed oUt,44 in regard to this provision, that, "It is not limited
to the so-called direct injury suffered by the employer who has
relationships with a particular trade union organization. It covers
140,ooo,ooo American people, any one of whom, under this language,
if he can show that he suffered any injury whatsoever from a secondary
'7Sen. Rep. No. io5 , 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 22.
"'Cong. Rec., vol. 93, No. 8o, p. 4323.
"312 U. S. 219 , 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L.ed. 788 (1941).
40315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 Led. 1178 (1942). This case reversed the
granting of an injunction against peaceful secondary picketing on free speech
grounds.
"See Section 3o3.
"Section lo (i) makes it mandatory upon. the Board to give priority to an
investigation of any charge of a violation .of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and, upon
reasonable belief of the truth of the charge, to seek an immediate injunction froma
district court.
"Section io (i) authorizes the federal courts to grant such injunctive relief
notwithstanding any other provision of law.
"Cong. Rec., vol. 93, No. 88 P. 5074.
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boycott or from a jurisdictional dispute, can come in with an action
against the union and flood our courts with a multitude of litigation."
Senator Taft in his reply did not expressly deny this, but said, "Under
the Sherman Act, the same question of boycott damage is subject to a
suit for treble damages and attorney's fees. In this case we simply
provide for the amount of the actual damages. But the parallel is
exactly the same...." This statement would seem to indicate that in
his judgment the questions of liability were to be the same as those
under the Sherman Act.
Before an attempt can be made to analyze the effect of this sub-
section upon the existing law, a review of earlier legal developments is
necessary. Prior to the Norris-La Guardia Act secondary boycotts
obstructing interstate commerce were civil and criminal offenses under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.45 Although it clearly appeared that the
dominant purpose of Congress in enacting the Sherman Act was the
regulation of monopolistic business enterprises the language found in
Section i of the Act, that "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to. be
illegal," is amenable to an interpretation which would include labor
combinations within its scope. This interpretation was first made in
the famous (or infamous) Danbury Hatters' case.46 This was an action
for triple damages47 under the Sherman Act brought by an employer
against a labor union which not only had gone on strike, but also had
boycotted plaintiff's hats in the hands of dealers outside the state. In
finding a cause of action under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court of
the United States stated that there was a combination falling within
the class of restraint of trade aimed at compelling third parties and
strangers to refrain from business relationships in the course of trade
except upon conditions that the combination imposed. Later cases
accepted this holding without question and built on it as a foundation.
Six years later, in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act.48 Sections
6 and 20 were direct responses to organized labor's cries for relief from
"526 Stat. 209 (189o), 15 U.S.C.A. Sections 1-7 (1934).
"OLoewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52 L. ed. 488 (igo8).
"Under the Sherman Act the federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce its
provisions, and the Attorney General of the United States is empowered to initiate
criminal prosecutions and resort to injunctive relief for violations of the Act. All
persons injured in their property or business by violations of others are allowed to
maintain civil suits for triple damages.
438 Stat. 730 ('914). The Clayton Act authorized requests for injunctive relief
by private individuals as well as by the federal government.
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the Sherman Act and from judicial control. The language of Section 6
was as follows:
"... Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be con-
strued to forbid the existence and operation of labor... organi-
zations ... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof,
be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws." 49
Section 2o provided:
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any
court of the United States... in any case ... involving, or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment .... unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury
to property... for which injury there is no adequae remedy at
law....
"And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit
any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from termi-
nating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform
any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or per-
suading others by peaceful means so to do; ... or from doing
any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of
such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts
specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be viola-
tions of any law of the United States."5o
The language of Section 6 was rendered almost meaningless in
1921, in the Duplex case,51 where the Supreme Court held the section
merely to be declaratory of.pre-existing law. In that case the plaintiff
manufactured newspaper printing presses in Michigan and installed
them at the purchaser's place of business, sending out employees to
supervise the installation. In the United States there were only four
manufacturers of such presses, all being in active competition. The
union had induced three of them to recognize and bargain with it, but
the plaintiff refused to do so, and a strike was immediately declared at
the plaintiff's factory. As only fourteen of the employees struck, there
was no material interference with the operation of the factory. Sales
and shipments continued, about eighty per cent of the output being
sold outside Michigan. In aid of its strike the union notified its mem-
bers not to work on the installation of presses which the plaintiff had
'18 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. Section 17 (1940).
tO38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. Section 52 (194o). (italics supplied)
5Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L.ed. 349
(1921).
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delivered in New York. In furtherance of this boycott, the union
warned the plaintiff's customers that it would be better for them not to
purchase, or having purchased, not to install, the plaintiffs presses,
and threatened them with loss if they did so. It also threatened cus-
tomers with sympathetic strikes in other trades, notified a trucking
company usually employed by customers to haul the presses not to do
so, and coerced union men by threatening them with loss of union
cards and with being blacklisted as "scabs" if they assisted in the
installation of the presses.
The Circuit Court of Appeals 52 had previously held that Section
20 of the Clayton Act had legalized secondary boycotts. In denying
that interpretation to the Act, the Supreme Court concluded that
because of the ambiguities of Section 6, which exempted only lawful
means and legitimate ends, Congress had not intended thereby to
exempt from the Sherman Act those activities of labor unions which
the Court considered restraints of trade. Furthermore, the Court
decided that the activities enumerated in Section 20 were rendered
non-enjoinable (and lawful) only where indulged in by immediate
parties to a labor dispute-i.e., an employer and his employees.5 3 In
consequence of this restrictive interpretation of Section 20, the Clayton
Act accomplished nothing by way of immunizing organized labor from
the Sherman Act or protecting concerted activities from the injunctive
weapon. Justice Brandeis, however, reached a different conclusion as
to the effect of Section 2o, his position being that it had legalized the
employment of certain means by employees, among them the refusal
to patronize, irrespective of the objectives that they thereby sought to
promote.54 His interpretation of the Clayton Act, which later became
'252 Fed. 722 (C.C.A. 2d, 1918).
'Note Justice Pitney's language in the Duplex case: "Nor can Section 20 be
regarded as bringing in all members of a labor organization as parties to a 'dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment' which proximately affects only a
few of them, with the result of conferring upon any and all members-no matter
how many thousands there may be, nor how remote from the actual conflict-those
exemptions which Congress in terms conferred only upon parties to the dispute."
254 U. S. 443, 472, 41 S. Ct. 172, 178, 65 L.ed. 349, 359 (1921).
"By 1914 the ideas of the advocates of legislation had fairly crystallized upon
the manner in which the inequality and uncertainty of the law should be removed.
It was to be done by expressly legalizing certain acts regardless of the effects pro-
duced by them upon other persons. As to them Congress was to extracf the element
of injuria from the damages thereby inflicted, instead of lea'ing judges to determine
according to their own economic and social views whether the damage inflicted on
an employer in an industrial struggle was damnum absque injuria, because an
incident of trade competition, or a legal injury, because in their opinion, economic-
ally and socially objectionable. This idea was presented to the committees which
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the law found only two other supporters on the Court. 55
The Supreme Court next grappled with labor and the Sherman
Act in 1922 in the so-called First Coronado case.56 A Local of the
United Mine Workers of America struck a Coronado Coal Co. mine,
dosed it down, burned coal cars, dynamited the mine, and behaved in
a highly illegal fashion. The company brought suit for triple damages
under the Sherman Act against both the Local and the National union,
assigning as the violation of the Act the stoppage of those shipments of
coal which would have gone to other states had the mine not been
prevented by the strike from continuing operations. Chief Justice Taft,
speaking for the Court, said that there had been only an indirect
iestraint or interference with commerce. He distinguished this situa-
tion from that in the Danbury Hatters' case by showing that there the
union had hit directly at interstate commerce. He thereby made clear
that whereas the Sherman Act could be employed to prevent interstate
boycotts, it could not be used to stop strikes, even when they interfered
with, or indirectly restrained, interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court, in the Second Coronado case, 57 pointed out
that on a new trial additional evidence was introduced by the company
showing a subjective intent on the part of the members of the Local to
restrain interstate commerce. 58 The Court then affirmed a judgment
only against the Local:
"The mere reduction in the supply of an artide to be
shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious pre-
reported the Clayton Act. The resulting law set out certain acts which had pre-
viously been held unlawful, whenever courts had disapproved of the ends for which
they were performed; it then declared that, when these acts were committed in the
course of an industrial dispute, they should not be held to violate any law of the
United States. In other words the Clayton Act substituted the opinion of Congress
as the propriety of the purpose for that of differing judges; and thereby it declared
that the relations between employers of labor and workingmen were competitive
relations, that organized competition was not harmful and that it justified injuries
necessarily inflicted in its course." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 485-486, 41 S. Ct. 172, 183, 65 L.ed. 349, 364-365 (1921). See also American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City control Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. ed.
189 (1921).
OJustices Clarke and Holmes concurred with Justice Brandeis in his dissent.
'United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66
L.ed. 975 (1922).
'Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct.
551, 69 L.ed. 963 (1925).
r'Oral evidence was introduced that by the strike the Local sought to keep the
coal out of the interstate markets until the mine became unionized. The testimony
indicated that this was intended in order to eliminate the competition in national
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vention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily an
indirect and remote obstruction of that commerce. But when
the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or
production is shown to be to restrain or control the supply
entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it
in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the
Anti-Trust Act." 59
In 1927, in the Bedford Cut Stone case60 the Supreme Court again
declined to interpret the Clayton Act as manifesting a Congressional
purpose to exempt labor unions from the Sherman Act. The Court
ordered an injunction against the Journeymen Stone Cutters Associa-
tion to restrain a peaceful refusal to work upon stone produced in the
plaintiff's quarries by non-union labor. No other crafts were called to
their aid and no coercion, intimidation, or other kind of boycott was
involved. The process by which this decision was achieved Justice
Stone elucidated in his separate opinion:
"As an original proposition, I should have doubted whether
the Sherman Act prohibited a labor union from peaceably
refusing to work upon material produced by non:unon labor or
by a rival union, even though interstate commerce were affected.
In the light of the policy adopted by Congress in the Clayton
Act, with respect to organized labor, ... I should not have
thought that such action as is now complained of was to be
regarded as an unreasonable and therefore prohibited restraint
of trade. But in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,... these
views were rejected by a majority of the court and a decree was
authorized restraining in precise terms any agreement not to
work or refusal to work, such as is involved here.... These
views, which I should not have hesitated to apply here, have
now been rejected again largely on the authority of the Duplex
case. For that reason alone, I concur with the majority." 6'
This was the existing situation when the Norris-La Guardia Act
became law in 1932. This Act deprived the lower federal courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the doing of specifically enu-
merated acts by the participants in a labor dispute as defined in that
Act. 62 The Act on its face has no relation to criminal proceedings or
to actions for triple damages under the Sherman Act, and early inter-
markets between union-mined and nonunion-mined coal, pursuant to the economic
program of the national union.
1268 U. S. 295, 310, 45 S. Ct. 551, 556, 69 L. ed. 963, 970 (1925).
"Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37,
47 S. Ct. 522, 71 L.ed. 916 (1927).
1274 U. S. 37, 55-56, 47 S. Ct. 522, 528, 71 L.ed. 916, 924-925 (1927).
2See note 6, supra.
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pretations regarded it as merely a procedural withdrawal of the power
of the federal courts to issue injunctions and not as an alteration of
the substantive law. Therefore, actions against labor unions continued
on the non-injunctive front. In 1940, the Apex case 63 came before the
Supreme Court. This was a suit for triple damages arising out of a
sit-down strike which was accompanied by violence and a refusal by
the union to allow the manufacturer to ship $8oo,ooo worth of finished
hosiery, eighty per cent of which was destined for interstate markets.
There the Court fitted a new doctrine over its own past interpretation
of the anti-trust laws, and found that those activities did not constitute
a conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce. The test which the
Court enunciated was that in order for the activities of a labor union
to constitute a direct restraint there must be a "showing of some form
of market control of a commodity, such as to monopolize the supply,
control its price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers." By
creating this test, the Court made it clear that the Sherman Act was
designed to prevent restraints on free competition in national markets,
and was not devised to set the federal courts up as policing agencies to
prevent those interferences with interstate transportation which local
authorities should punish.64
In a case decided shortly after the Apex case, Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc.,65 the Court
held that, where a labor dispute existed, an injunction contrary to the
provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act could not be issued against a
labor union accused of violating the Sherman Act.. This decision
merely made certain activities of labor unions non-enjoinable, and, in
thereby restricting the scope of the remedy of injunction under the
Norris-La Guardia Act, it naturally led to predictions of increased
employment of criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act in labor
cases.
But this weapon was virtually destroyed by the decision in United
O'Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 31o U. S. 469, 6o S. Ct. 982, 84 L.ed. 1311 (1940).
The literature on this case is voluminous: Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor
(1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 222; Cavers, Labor v. Sherman Act (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 246; Landis, The Apex Case (1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 191; Brown, The Apex Case
and Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws (1941) 21 B. U. L.
Rev. 48.
"The Apex decision was a very significant victory for organized labor. Of course,
this decision did not legalize a violent or a sit-down strike. The defendants in that
case were made defendants in a tort action in a state court-the appropriate tribunal
for the adjudication of claims of assault and malicious destruction of property.
5311 U. S. 91, 61 S. Ct. 122, 85 L.ed. 63 (1941).
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States v. Hutcheson.66 There a criminal prosecution for violation of
the Sherman Act was instituted by the Department of Justice against
the defendant A.F.L. union, which was involved in a jurisdictional
dispute with another A.F.L. union. Members of both unions were
employed by the complaining corporation, and defendant union
struck and picketed to oust the rival union of its jurisdiction over
certain employees. Defendant union also picketed the corporation's
lessee and struck against contractors doing work for the corporation.
Besides these activities circulars were sent to persons in various states
urging them not to purchase the corporation's products. This latter
activity had aspects of primary and secondary boycott. Demurrers to
the indictment were sustained, and the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Frankfurter, affirmed the judgment of the lower court:
"Therefore, whether trade union conduct constitutes a
violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by
reading the Sherman Law and § 2067 of the Clayton Act and the
Norris-La Guardia Act as a harmonizing text of outlawry of
labor conduct.
"... If the facts laid in the indictment come within the
conduct enumerated in § 2o of the Clayton Act they do not
constitute a crime within the general terms of the Sherman Law
because of the explicit command of that section that such
conduct shall not be 'considered or be held to be violations of
any law of the United States.' So long as a union acts in its self-
interest and does not combine with non-labor grouPs,6 8 the licit
and the illicit under § 2o are not to be distinguished by any
judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which
the particular union activities are the means. There is nothing
remotely within the terms of § 20 that differentiates between
00312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L.ed. 788 (1941). This case arose out of a drive
by the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice to eliminate certain labor
union activities which that Division felt to have a restraining effect on interstate
commerce.
6Sec. 20 of the Clayton Act, which had sought to remove certain of labor's
activities from the reach of federal injunction, had also in its concluding clause
protected those activities from being considered violations of any law of the United
States, including the Sherman Act.
8See United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169, 71 L.ed. 403 (1926).
Union millwork manufacturers in Chicago, because of the difference between union
and non-union labor standards, were being undersold by non-union manufacturers
located in other states. As a result, Chicago manufacturers had to reduce operations.
In order to maintain employment and union standards, the union made an agree-
ment with the manufacturers whereby the employers would employ only union
carpenters and the union members would work only on union-made millwork. This
activity was held to be a violation of the Sherman Act.
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trade union conduct directed against an employer because of a
controversy arising in the relation between employer and
employee, as such, and conduct similarly directed but ultimately
due to an internecine struggle between two unions seeking the,
favor of the same employer.
"But to argue, as it was urged before us, that the Duplex case
still governs for the purposes of a criminal prosecution is to say
that which on the equity side of the court is allowable conduct
may in a criminal proceeding become the road to prison.
"The underlying aim of the Norris-La Guardia Act was to
restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formu-
lated in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated, so Congress
believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction.... The
Norris-La Guardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the
Clayton Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union
activities as redefined by the later Act."69
Thus, Justice Frankfurter repudiated the Duplex case by reading
Section 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act into Section 20 of the Clayton
Act. The Duplex case was overruled both with reference to its sub-
stantive Sherman Law doctrine and to its interpretation of Section 20
of the Clayton Act, but the technique of Justice Frankfurter places the
onus of this bverruling upon Congress and not the Court, thereby
defending the Court from the criticism so frequently made at that time
that it had been indulging somewhat too extensively in overruling cases
decided prior to the "reconstruction in the membership of the
Court."70
The Department of Justice's drive against illegal labor activities
was stalled by the Hutcheson decision.7 1 Efforts to restrict the holding
in the Hutcheson case have been confounded by the United States
Supreme Court in numerous indictments dismissed on the authority of
that decision.7 2 The result of that decision was that those unions
60312 U. S. 219, 231, 232, 234-236, 61 S. Ct. 463, 466, 467, 468, 85 L.ed. 788, 793,
794, 795 (1941)- (italics supplied)
" See Landis, The Apex Case, Addendum (1941) 26 Corn. L. Q. 212A, 212B.
"*'Vhen Mr. Thurman Arnold was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Anti-Trust Division, he announced [9 U.S.L. Week 2485 (1941)] that, notwithstand-
ing the Hutcheson decision, the following labor activities would be considered
illegal under the Sherman Act and prosecuted by the Department of Justice:
i. Where carried on by one union in disregard of another union's certification
by the National Labor Relations Board as proper bargaining representative.
2. Where evidencing an intent to erect a tariff wall around a given locality.
3. Where designed to exclude efficient methods of production from building
construction.
4. Where directed against small, independent businessmen.
5. Where effecting artificial price-fixing.
nSee United States v. Building and Construction Trades Council, 313 U. S. 539,
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sufficiently strong to control the marketing of goods in whole areas
would be able to exclude competing goods and to promote unreason-
ably high noncompetitive prices,* thereby insuring their restricted
memberships steady employment at attractively high wage rates. An
instance of a union economic embargo of this sort appeared in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers73 decided in 1945. There a local union, which
controlled all employment in the manufacture and installation of
electrical equipment in the New York City area would allow no outside
manufactured equipment to be sold in the New York market. This
embargo was placed on union-made and non union-made equipment
alike, and was effected by the refusal of the installation electricians to
handle equipment not locally produced by their fellow members. The
tight market control which ensued was very harmful to local consumers
and beneficial only to local union members and their employers. It is
true that the Supreme Court disapproved of this practice insofar, but
only insofar, as it depended on the co-operation of the employers. But
nonetheless, it left the union free to use its own economic strength,
quite adequate to the occasion, in continuing this anti-competitive
embargo.
Justice Black, speaking for the Court, observed:
"Our holding means that the same labor union activities
may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent
upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with
business groups. This, it is argued, brings about a wholly
undesirable result-one which leaves labor unions free to engage
in conduct which restrains trade. But the desirability of such
an exemption of labor unions is a question for the determination
of Congress." 7
4
The decision was a union defeat in form but very nearly a union
victory in substance. It demonstrated that previous judicial declara-
61 S. Ct. 839, 85 L.ed. 1508 (1941) (A.F.L.) secondary strike in spite of C.I.O.'s
certification by National Labor Relations Board in proceeding to which A.F.L. was
a party); United States v. International Hod Carriers' and Common Laborers' Dis-
trict Council, 313 U. S. 539 S. Ct. 839, 85 L.ed. 1508 (1941) (conspiracy to prevent
mixers from without the state from shipping truck mixers into the city, upon the
ground that labor saving was thereby effected); United States v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners, 313 U. S. 539, 61 S. Ct. 839, 85 L.ed. 15o8 '(941)
(conspiracy by A.F.L. against employers whose employees had chosen C.I.O. after
election held under the direction of the National Labor Relations Board). See also
United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 318 U. S. 741, 63 S. Ct. 665, 87
L.ed. 1120 (1943).
"'325 U. S. 797, 65 S. Ct. 1533, 89 L.ed. 570 (1945).
"'325 U. S. 797, 8io, 65 S. Ct. 1533, 154o, 89 L.ed. 570 (1945).
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tions that the Sherman Act still had some application to labor unions
were not mere empty phrases, but the Act restricts nothing but the use
of a particular technique which even monopolistically-minded unions
are not likely to find essential.
Thus, it may be clearly perceived that the existing national labor
policy, prior to the 1947 labor legislation, was a bedlam of conflicting
conceptions in its quest for a consistent rule to determine the legality
of labor objectives. The Taft-Hartley Act is an attempt by Congress to
formulate a national labor policy which will eliminate much of this
confusion. It has been argued by opponents of the legislation that
strikes and boycotts proscribed by this Act are again subject to tests
and sanctions similar to those applied under prior interpretations of
the anti-trust laws, and there is some basis for these contentions. How-
ever, there are certain provisions which must be made dear at the
outset. Section 303 does not give private parties the right to seek
injunctions against the strikes and secondary boycotts declared unlaw-
ful by Section 8 (b) (4). The Act restores equity jurisdiction to the
federal courts to grant "such temporary relief or restraining order as it
deems just and proper" only at the instance of the National Labos
Relations Board after it has issued a complaint. 75 It is worthy of special
note, moreover, that, by its express terms, such strikes and secondary
boycotts are unlawful under Section 303 "for .the purposes of this
section only."'7 6 This would seem to make it clear that there is no right
to bring a criminal adtion under anti-trust laws and conspiracy statutes
for violation of this section. 77 The requirement of Section 1o (e) that
"the court shall cause notice to be served ... and thereupon shall have
jurisdiction" appears to preclude the granting of relief ex parte. Fur-
ther, compliance must be made with the provisions of Rule 65 (b) of
the Rules for Civil Procedure requiring that an application for tempo-
rary injunction should be set for hearing as soon as possible after a tem-
porary restraining order has been issued, and the provisions of Rule 65
(d) requiring that "every order granting an injunction and every
restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance, shall be
specific in terms, shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by refer-
ence to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be
restrained." The federal injunction, which was effectively removed
from the employer's arsenal of weapons by the Norris-La Guardia Act,
7See § 1o 0).
76See § 3o3 (a). (italics supplied)
"See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L.ed. 788 (1941).
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has been returned, but in a much less deadly form than that resorted
to under the anti-trust laws. Attacks upon the injunction under the
Sherman Act were directed largely at the procedural ease with which
it was possible for management to restrain the concerted activities of
labor. This evil has been corrected without denying the employer his
right to petition for equitable relief where the union is engaged in a
prohibited activity.
Section 303 authorizes an action for damages by "yho ever shall be
injured in his business or property" by a prohibited strike or boycott.
Under this provision, of course, the number of persons eligible to sue
is very great. However, it is likely that judicial construction of the legal
concepts "business" and "property" and the use of a proximate cause
doctrine will allow only those within a "reasonably forseeable" area of
possible injury to recover. Damages may be assessed only against the
funds of the union, not against the assets of any individual. Since the
Second Coronado case 78 labor unions have been proper parties to sue
or be sued as entities in federal courts.7 9 Apparently diversity of citi-
zenship will be necessary to recover in a federal court, although the
amount in controversy will not be relevant.8 0 Any state court willing to
take jurisdiction of the parties may determine the cause.8 '
An intent is evident to define in the broadest possible language the
terms strike and boycott to cover any union activity designed to achieve
ends prohibited by the Act.8 2 Much litigation will inevitably revolve
around the phrase contained in Section 8 (b) (4), which brings into
question the objective of the labor practice alleged to be unfair. 83
78Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69
L.ed. 963 (1925).
' 5oi (b) provides: "Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity
and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States."
1'Sec 303 (b); cf. § 3oi (a) which removes necessity for diversity of dtizenship in
breach of contract cases.
81Sec. 303 (b).
2Sec. 5Ol of Title V defines a strike as "any strike or other concerted stoppage of
work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption
of operations by employees." Further, § 13 of the National Labor Relations Act has
been amended to limit the unqualified right to strike contained in that Act by the
addition of the words "except as specifically provided for herein" and the addition of
language that the Act shall not be construed "to affect the limitations or qualifica-
tions on. that right."
83See Sec. 8 (b) (4) which provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to commit certain acts, where an object thereof is: see subsections
(A), (B), (C), and (D). President Truman in his veto message complained that the
provision "would invite employers to find any pretext for arguing that 'an object' of
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Obviously, the intent of the legislators was to close any loophole which
would prevent the Board from giving relief against activities pro-
scribed by the section simply because one of the purposes of such
strikes might have been lawful. Latent in this phrase is the question
whether the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" intents
which developed in the Coronado cases8 4 under the Sherman Act is
intended to be imported into this Act. For example, if the view be
adopted that the union's activity violates the section if any object be
unlawful, this would seem to adopt a view even more restrictive than
that followed by the courts when concerted activities of labor unions
were subjecte4I to prosecution under the conspiracyS5 and anti-trust
laws. Even then the test in determining whether the union activity was
unlawful was that of primary objective. On the other hand, if only the
overt demands of the union are to be looked to, without examining
into hidden motives, then the prohibitions of the section may mean
little.88 The question is a complex one,8 7 but the Board and the courts
will in all probability require a demonstration that in the light of all
the facts the predominant motive in the strike is illegal.
As a matter of statutory history, it would seem that Congress did
not wish to create or restore a liability under the Sherman Act. The
provision for the recovery of only single damages under Section 303
the union's activity was one of the [objects within the act], even though the primary
object was fully legitimate."
S259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L.ed. 975 (1922); 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551, 69
L.ed. 963 (1925). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3io U. S. 469, 6o S. Ct. 982, 84
L.ed. 1311 (194o).
8 See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (Mass. 1842).
"For example, it is possible to exercise an economic pressure on employer A by
a series of strikes, called for wholly legitimate overt reasons, against his suppliers,
B and C. If only the overt demands are to be examined, then there is no violation of
the section, even though the real objective is to drive employer A out of business.
87Certainly one of the most significant questions to come before the Board ind
the courts will be whether an alleged violation of this provision was one authorized
by the union or its agents or was an unauthorized or spontaneous action on the part
of an employee or a group of employees. In relations to this problem the impact of
Sec. 2 (13) is to be considered. This section provides that "In determining whether
any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." This provision
adopts the common-law rule and was primarily directed at the decision of the
Supreme Court in United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 330 U. S. 395,
67 S. Ct. 775(1947), which rested, in turn, upon Sec. 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
That section, which requires actual participation in or authorization or ratification
of particular acts, is not applicable under the present Act. Section 2 (2) applies the
same rule to employers.
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also indicates that triple damages under the Sherman Act were not
contemplated. Private litigants are not permitted to storm the courts
for injunctive relief as they did prior to the Norris-La Guardia Act.
And under Section 8 (b) (4) (B) labor unions are allowed to resort
to secondary action to compel an employer to bargain where he is
under a legal duty to do so.8 8 However, it is quite apparent that the
secondary activities in the Allen Bradley and Hutcheson cases are now
unfair labor practices,8 9 although the Act does not make secondary
boycotts a crime as did the Sherman Act.
Freedom of Speech of Employer and Employee
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press...." First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.
A problem underlying all unfair labor practices, whether of
employers or unions, is that arising from the constitutional guarantee
of free speech explicit in the First Amendment and implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This protection
of individual civil liberties led Congress to incorporate into the Taft-
Hartley Act Section 8 (c) which provides in general terms that no
statement of views, arguments, or opinions not coercive on its face
shall "constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice." 90 This
provision indicates clearly the dissatisfaction of Congress with the
administration of the original National Labor Relations Act. Its first
noteworthy feature is that it is phrased generally enough to apply to
all utterances, whether by unions or employers. Secondly, it in all
"'Sec. 8 (b) (4) (B) makes illegal strikes or boycotts designed to "force or require
any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified ... under
the provisions of Sec. 9." This is probably in the nature of a saving clause, for sub-
section 4 (A) would seem to outlaw a strike which would necessarily have as one of
its objectives forcing the employer to cease dealing with any other person.
8OThe jurisdictional strike illustrated by the Hutcheson case is prohibited by
§ (b) (4) (D). This provision makes it illegal to assign work tasks to employees who
other concerted activity to force an employer to assign work tasks to employees who
are members of that union in preference to employees who are members of another
union or who are not members of any union, unless the employer fails to comply
with a Board order or certification determining the employees' representative for
such work.
°(italics supplied) The exact wording of § 8 (c) is as follows: "The expressing of
any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
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probability requires the Board to discard certain doctrines which it
had developed under the original Act.
To begin with, it must be assumed that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was never intended by Congress to abridge the employer's
constitutional right to give free expression to his views. Section 8 (1)
of that Act provided that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7." The substantive evil aimed
at there was the use by an employer of his superior economic position
to prevent his employees from exercising the rights recognized by
Congress in that legislation.9 ' The Board appears to have adopted an
extreme policy with regard to employer utterances.92 In its Third
Annual Report the Board took the view that the slightest suggestions
or activities which would be innocuous and without significance be-
tween other individuals, become enormously significant and "heighten
to proportions of coercion when engaged in by the employer in his
relationship with his employees." 3 The extremity of the Board's
paternalistic view toward labor unions has been recognized by certain
courts.9 4 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has commented that
the Board's position is predicated upon the unsupported assumption
that labor, as a group, is today docile and uninformed:
"The still picture of a sheep-like body of laboring men led
by a dominating employer, is not representative of the true
situation. Since the passage of the [National Labor Relations]
Act, the picture has been quite effectively streamlined. We see
today a mobile labor force, strengthened by statutory safe-
guards, working on comparatively even terms with the em-
DThose rights guaranteed in § 7 ("to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing') have not been altered by the Taft-Hartley Act.
nSee Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., i N.L.R.B. 1, 22-23 (1935), aff'd 303
U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571, 82 L.ed. 831 (1938), where the Board said: "The prohibition
of § 8 (1) clearly reaches the employer who urges and persuades men in his employ
not to form a labor organization. Such 'advice' is not the advice of a person on an
equal plane and having an unprejudiced mind. It is the 'advice' of an employer who
has the right to discharge the employees to whom the advice is given-to control to a
large extent his economic position and -thus his welfare." See also Ford Motor Co.,
14 N.L.R.B. 341 (1939); Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 53 (939).
n7hird Annual Report of National Labor Relations Board (1938) 125.
"The view of the Board "that an employer's opinion of labor organizations and
organizers must, because of the authority of master over servant, nearly always prove
coercive," was expressly rejected in N.L.R.B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. (2d) 9o5
(C.C.A. 6th, 1940), cert. denied 312 U. S. 689, 61 S. Ct. 621, 85 L.ed. 1126 (194).
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ployer, who may often owe his particular strength to a superior
economic, educational and social position. Under this view of
the modern industrial situation, we surely cannot indulge in
any assumption of weakness on the part of the employee."9 5
As a matter of general constitutional doctrine, the right of free
speech and publication, guaranteed by the Constitutions of'the United
States and of the several states, has its limitations. The question in such
a case of an alleged infringement of these constitutional rights is whe-
ther the words used are employed in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 96 that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress or the state legislature
has a right to prevent. In conformance with this doctrine, the courts
have held that the National Labor Relations Act, and similar state
statutes, were not intended to abridge an employer's constitutional
right of free speech and publication concerning labor unions, so long
as statements made in the exercise of these rights do not amount to an
interference with, or restraint or coercion of, his employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by the statute. Thus, utterances of an
employer which, standing alone and separated from their back-
ground,97 did not appear to be coercive on their face, were held by the
Supreme Court of the United States in National Labor Relations
Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 98 not to be a proper basis upon
which the Board might predicate the unfair labor practice of employer
interference.
In the later case of National Labor Relations Board v. American
Tube Bending Co.,99 decided in 1943, employers received further
reassurance, provided by Judge Learned Hand. A few days before an
election by the company's employees to determine their bargaining
91E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 116 F. (2d) 388, 398 (C.C.A. 4th,
,94o), cert. denied 313 U. S. 571, 61 S. Ct. 595, 85 L.ed. 1529 (1941).
"Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court in Schenck v.
United States, laid down the following test: "The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances aid are of such nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." 249 U. S.
47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.ed. 470, 473-474 (1919).
"¢Under the original Act the Board had developed the "totality-of-conduct"
doctrine under which it held that statements not coercive upon their face might
become coercive when uttered in a background of anti-union activity by an employer
guilty of other unfair labor practices.
8314 U. S. 469, 62 S. St. 344, 86 L.ed. 348 ('94).




representative the president of the company sent a letter to employees
reminding them that the election was by secret ballot, that they could
vote in any way they wished, and that they should consider whether the
leadership they were about to select was interested in the employee's
welfare or not. It was also pointed out that whatever they should
decide, the company would cooperate, knowing that the interests of
the employees and the company were the same. The president also
delivered a speech to the employees, stating that the company favored
an open shop and appealed, by implication at least, for them to reject
both unions on the ballot. The Board found the employer guilty of ah
unfair practice, but in the Circuit Court of Appeals the Board's order
was set aside, and a petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court. However, as Justice Holmes once stated, "The denial
of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits
of the case, as the bar 'has been told many times."1 00
On the other hand, in 1944, an employer who posted that "it is not
necessary for any employee to join any organization or to pay dues to
any organization to continue in our employ" was found guilty of an
unfair labor practice. 101 The employer took the position that although
his notice was intended to discourage membership in the union, he
could so address his employees in pursuit of his right of freedom of
speech. The court found the notice objectionable, however, because
uttered in a background of anti-union activity on the part of the
employer.
These cases illustrate that attendant facts and circumstances may
indicate an act to be coercive which when considered by itself does not
disclose any such conduct. As the power of organized labor has grown,
the Board has recognized that employer's statements carry progressively
less restraining force and for that reason now infers a threat of coercion
only when "reasonably contemporaneous" unfair practices indicate
that a statement is likely to have a positive coercive effect.102 Therein
"'See United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490 , 43 S. Ct. 181, 182, 67 L.ed. 361,
364 (1923). On the same day the Supreme Court refused to hear the Tube Bending
case, it also denied certiorari in the case of Trojan Powder Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board where the Board's cease and' desist order had been upheld by thi;
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 135 F. (2d) 337 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943), cert. denied 336
U. S. 768, 64 S. Ct. 76, 88 L.ed. 458 (1943), petition for rehearing denied, 320 U.-§.
813, 64 S. Ct. 194, 88 L.ed.491 (1943).
"'National Labor Relations Board v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268 (C.C.A. 3d,
1944), cert. denied 323 U. S. 774, 65 S. Ct. 135, 89 L.ed. 619 (1944).
"'Fisher-Governor Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1947); La Salle Steel Co., 72 N.L.R.B.
78 (1947).
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the Board has been forced by the courts to retreat from its original
position that an employer has no right to express his views to his
employees as to whether or how they should organize. However, pro-
ponents of the free speech provision in the Taft-Hartley Act felt that
the retreat had been so reluctant that many employers still feared to
express themselves on labor affairs.
Insofar as speech is declared not to constitute an unfair labor
practice ,the effect of this subsection will be to preclude a finding that
speech in its context is coercive, unless on its face it contains a bribe or
threat. But the provision that speech shall not be evidence of an unfair
practice is more difficult to understand. The purpose of this clause is
to forestall the Board's practice of considering past anti-union state-
ments made by an employer as evidence of motive in discharging an
employee. Under Section 8 (c) such statements may no longer be used
as evidence. It thus appears that the Board is denied the right to
consider evidence which would be admissible in a court under common
law rules of evidence. However, Congress, by ordering a blanket
exclusion of this particular evidence, is merely exercising its recog-
nized power to prescribe what evidence the Board shall hear. Clearly,
this protection afforded the employer is much wider than the consti-
tutional guarantee of free speech. But it should be noted that the
provision is limited to "views, arguments or opinions" and does not
cover instructions, directions, or statements coercive in themselves.
The right of free speech as invoked by unions generally takes the
form of peaceful picketing as an aid in attaining their objectives. This
technique for achieving constitutional immunity for peaceful picketing
was suggested in a dictum by Justice Brandeis in Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union.103 That case involved the picketing of the premises
of a self-employed tilelayer in order to compel him to sign a union
contract which would prohibit him from personally performing the
manual labor of his business. Justice Brandeis characterized peaceful
picketing as mere advertising of the facts of a labor dispute and
remarked in passing that such activity was protected against state
interference by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. This
observation afforded the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Thornhill v. Alabama0 4 and Carlson v. California,10 5 a basis for
invalidating a state statute and a county ordinance, which forbade all
1033o U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857,.81 L.ed. 1229 (1937).
31'o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L.ed. 1O82 (1940).
"3lo U. S. io6, 6o S. Ct. 746, 84 L.ed. 1104 (1940).
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picketing. By viewing picketing as a method of communication, the
Court was able to assert that picketing was entitled to the same protec-
tion against state interference by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment
as was any other form of communication. 'Proof of clear and present
danger to justify suppression of the right must rest upon a showing of
acts of violence or mass picketing. Thus, in the Thornhill case, the
Court stated:
"In the circumstances of our times, the dissemination of
information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be
regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed
by the Constitution.
"It is true that the rights of employers and employees to
conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a
share in the products of industry are subject to modification or
qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist.
This is but an instance of the power of the State to set the limits
of permissible contest open to industrial combatants. It does not
follow that the State in dealing with- the evils arising from in-
dustrial disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right
to discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public
concern." 1 0 6
This conception of picketing has been criticized on the ground that
since picketing is a weapon of industrial conflict, and inherently a
coercive rather than an enlightening technique, it is inappropriate to
immunize picketing with the constitutional safeguards surrounding
newspaper or radio advertising, and that legality of picketing should
properly depend upon the substantive law of each state.107 However,
the Supreme Court, in 1941, went a step further in making peaceful
picketing immune from injunction by extending the privilege to
picketing carried on by persons not in a proximate relation of employ-
ment with the plaintiff employer. The Court, speaking through Justice
Frankfurter, declared:
"A state cannot exclude working men from peacefully exer-
cising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of
employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer
and those directly employed by him. The interdependence of
economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has
become commonplace."108
'-"xo U. S. 88, 102, 103-104, 60 S. Ct. 736, 744, 745, 84 L.ed. 1o93, 1102, 1103
(1940).
2"See, for example, Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech (194o)
26 A.B.A.J. 709. See also Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1947)
Sec. 136.
" American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 326, 61 S. Ct. 568, 570,
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It would seem quite apparent that picketing, even where no
violence exists, tends to influence conduct in other ways than by the
communication of ideas. Many prospective cutomers will decline to
cross a picket line either because they feel unpleaasntly conspicuous
when they do so or because they shrink from the picket's expression of
disapproval. The remoteness of picketing from free speech was noted
by Professor Corwin in the following words: "In many circumstances
picketing, even when unaccompanied by actual violence or fraud, is
coercive and intended so to be; and when it is, it is related to freedom
of speech to about the same extent and in the same sense as the right to
tote a gun is related to the right to move from place to place.' 109 On
the other hand, to hold that no such privilege exists is to hold that
labor unions may be denied the only practicable method of communi-
cating the ideas they wish to express. Faced with this dilemma the
Supreme Court of the United States has wisely qualified its earlier
position that the right to picket peacefully is absolute.
In Bakery & Pastery Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl,'i ° decided
in 1942, the Court in a more cautious opinion, extended the constitu-
tional protection to secondary picketing. There a union of truck
drivers attempted to induce two peddlers, who worked seven days a
week distributing bakery products in competition with the truck
drivers, to work only six days and to employ a member of the union on
the seventh day."' When the peddlers refused, the union picketed the
bakeries from which the peddlers obtained their goods and also some
of the peddlers' customers. The state court's injunction" 2 against this
picketing was set aside, but there was language in Justice Jackson's
opinion which appears to mean that the injunction would have been
permitted to stand if the state court had been more explicit in holding
85 L.ed. 855, 857 (1941). None of plaintiff's employees had joined the union, so that
the picketing was carried on solely by strangers. The plaintiff obtained an injunction
in an Illinois court on the ground that, under the law of that state, picketing by
persons not in the proximate relation of employment, was unlawful. This holding
was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, thus denying the right of a
state court to restrain such picketing.
"'Corwin, Book Review (1942) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 484, 486.
110315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L.ed. 1178 (1942).
"'The peddler did all his own work, laboring seven days a week and earning
approximately $32. Out of this he must absorb credit losses and maintain a delivery
truck. The peddler was requested to employ a relief driver at the union scale of
$6 per day.
mWohl v. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Union, 259 App. Div. 868, 19
N. Y. S. (2d) 811 (1940).
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the picketing to be in aid of an unlawful labor objective.113 And he
specifically said that "A state is not required to tolerate in all places
and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual.""14
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, declared:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may' induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of ideas which are
being disseminated. Hence, those aspects of picketing make it
the subject of restrictive regulation.""15
In the Ritter's Cafe case, members of the Carpenters and Joiners
Union peaceably picketed in front of a restaurant, whose sole pro-
prietor had awarded a building contract to a contractor who employed
non-union labor. The state court enjoined the picketing on the ground
that it violated the state anti-trust statute.116 In a five to four deci-
sion,117 on the same day the Wohl case was decided, the Supreme Court
of the United States sustained the injunction on the ground that the
' Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid an injunction against picket-
ing a business which is "wholly outside the economic context of the
real dispute," and which is owned by a person whose sol relation
thereto arises from dealing with one of the disputants. The Supreme
Court did not appear to consider the fact that picketing the plaintiff
at his place of business was the only effective means whereby the union
could present to the public the facts of the labor dispute. To picket the
contractor at the place of construction would have been almost useless.
It is interesting to note that the picketing which took place here could
not have been enjoined by the federal courts, because a labor dispute
u"The respondents say that the basis of the decision below was revealed in a
subsequent opinion of the Court of Appeals, where it was said with regard to the
present case that 'we held that it was an unlawful labor objective to attempt to
coerce a peddler employing no employees in his business and making approximately
thirty-two dollars a week'. Opera-on-Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 357, 34 N. E. (2d)
349, writ of certiorari denied in 314 U. S. 615 .... But this lacks the deliberateness
and formality of a certification, and was uttered in a case where the question of the
existence of a right to free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment was neither
raised nor considered." 315 U. S. 769, 774-775, 62 S. Ct. 8M6, 818-8ig, 86 L.ed. 1178,
1183 (1942).
1u315 U. S. 769, 775, 62 S. Ct. 8M6, 81g, 86 L.ed. 1178, 1184 (1942).
m315 U. S. 769, 776-777, 62 S. Ct. 8M6, 819-820, 86 L.ed. 1178, 1184 (1942).
mCarpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 138
S. W. (2d) 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (appeal from order granting temporary in-
junction); 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (appeal from order granting
permanent injunction); writ of error refused 136 Tex. 414 (1941)-
n7315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L.ed. 1143 (1942).
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existed within the meaning of Section 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
The Supreme Court decisions discussed here have had a far-
reaching effect on the common law of the states, for by identifying pick-
eting with free speech the Court has very conveniently extended the
power of judicial review over the statutory and common law of the
states on the subject of picketing. The inconsistency in the Wohl and
Ritter opinions reflects the uncertainty of that tribunal in peaceful
picketing cases. Picketing has been recognized as being not only a
means of communicating grievances but also as a method of exerting
economic pressure. Because of the former aspect it cannot be wholly
forbidden; because of the latter, it must be limited as are other civil
liberties, and must be exercised in conjunction with other rights equally
as desirable. 118
It seems probable that peaceful picketing to disseminate "views,
arguments or opinion" is still lawful either under Section 8 (c) of the
Taft-Hartley Act or as constitutionally protected. If a union, or a
group of employees, do no more than disseminate the facts concerning
a particular employer, or if they confine themselves to addressing
arguments to employees of another employer, or inform the trade of
substandard conditions at an employer's factory, there would appear to
be no liability. The same rule should govern picketing to inform the
public. If, after a union informs the public that employer A is unfair,
employer B of his own initiative ceases to purchase the goods of
employer A, there would appear to be no liability on the part of
employer B or the union. The prohibited area seems confined to strikes,
or other refusals to process, by a labor organization or its agent,
intended to have a "secondary" effect. However, there is reason to
believe that Section 8 (c) will be held inapplicable to Section (b) (4).
In the first place, to accept an interpretation that the free speech
provision immunizes picketing would be to grant that picketing is
umSee Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, where a
state court's decree enjoining peaceful picketing was affirmed when there were, in
the background, acts of violence by members of the union. The Court, in finding
that the injunction was necessary, said: "We are here concerned with power and not
the wisdom of its exercise. We merely hold that in the circumstances of the record
before us the injunction authorized by the Supreme Court of Illinois does not
transgress its constitutional power. That other states have chosen a different path in
such a situation indicates differences of social view in a domain in which the states
are free to shape their local policy .... To maintain the balance of our federal
system..., demands at once zealous regard for the guaranties of the Bill of Rights
and due recognition of the powers belonging to the states." 312 U. S. 287, 296, 61
S. Ct. 552, 559, 85 L.ed. 836, 843 (1941).
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merely an expression of opinion free from the taint of threat or pro-
mise. Secondly, the legislative history indicates that the purpose of the
section was to protect employer, rather than union, expression. 119 And,
thirdly, if all non-coercive expressions were intended to be exempt
from Section 8 (b) (4), the phrase "to induce or encourage" would
mean very little.
The provision may be subject to attack on the ground that since it
bans inducement directed at employees, it violates the First Amend-
ment. The unions might argue that they have just as much right to
communicate their grievances to employees as they have to the public,
even though the purpose of such speech is to induce the employees
within the meaning of the Act. The employer might utilize the argu-
ment that because the union is still free to disseminate information to
the public, there is no unreasonable legislative restraint upon free
speech. The Supreme Court can logically sustain the provision by
adopting a view similar to the position taken in the Ritter's Cafe
case, 120 that the Constitution protects strikes and secondary boycotts
within an area of allowable economic conflict. And the Court may also
hold that Congress can constitutionally curtail speech having the "clear
and present danger" of causing a concerted refusal on the part of
employees, insofar as Congress can validly ban such activities.
Conclusion
The principal objectives of labor in its long and successful crusade
have been reasonable wages, hours, working conditions, and recogni-
tion for purposes of collective bargaining. Labor representatives de-
manded, and in the National Labor Relations Act received, the right
to equal bargaining power with management. That Act addressed
itself only to the issue of how the parties were to be brought together
peacefully at the bargaining table. From there they are on their own,
prudence forbidding any attempt by the government to interfere with
the play of competitive forces in this field of human relations. The
Taft-Hartley Act does not strike at collective bargaining,12' but is
29Sen. Rep. No. 1o5, 8oth Cong., st Sess. (1947) 23, 24.
noSee Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L.ed. 1143 (1942).
'2"Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
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